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Abstract For a long time, regularity accounts of causation have virtually van-
ished from the scene. Problems encountered within other theoretical frame-
works have recently induced authors working on causation, laws of nature, or
methodologies of causal reasoning – as e.g. May (Kausales Schliessen. Eine
Untersuchung über kausale Erklärungen und Theorienbildung. Ph.D. thesis,
Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, 1999), Ragin (Fuzzy-set social science.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Graßhoff and May (Causal
regularities. In W. Spohn, M. Ledwig, & M. Esfeld (Eds.), Current issues
in causation (pp. 85–114). Paderborn: Mentis, 2001), Swartz (The concept
of physical law (2nd ed.). http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/, 2003),
Halpin (Erkenntnis, 58, 137–168, 2003) – to direct their attention back to
regularity theoretic analyses. In light of the latest proposals of regularity
theories, the paper at hand therefore reassesses the criticism raised against
regularity accounts since the INUS theory of causation of Mackie (The cement
of the universe. A study of causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). It is
shown that most of these objections target strikingly over-simplified regularity
theoretic sketches. By outlining ways to refute these objections it is argued that
the prevalent conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been
hasty.
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Introduction
A mere glance at the abundance of controversial literature on causation
published during the past 30 years reveals that regularity accounts of causation
– until recently – virtually vanished from the scene. For lack of space and
interest, studies not primarily concerned with causation every now and then
roughly explicated our causal intuitions in terms of regularities, but hardly
anybody seriously wanting to analyze causation resorted to regularity accounts
any more. Problems encountered within other theoretical frameworks have re-
cently induced philosophers working on causation, laws of nature, or method-
ologies of causal reasoning – as e.g. May (1999), Ragin (2000), Graßhoff and
May (2001), Swartz (2003), or Halpin (2003) – to direct their attention back
to regularity theoretic analyses. In light of the latest proposals of regularity
theories as can be found in Graßhoff and May (2001) and Baumgartner and
Graßhoff (2004), the paper at hand therefore reassesses the criticism raised
against regularity accounts since Mackie’s famous, yet failed, (1974) attempts
at analyzing causation with recourse to regularities among types of events.
Notwithstanding the skepticism encountered by Hume’s regularity theo-
retic successors, there are several commonly acknowledged advantages of an
analysis of causation in terms of regularities. A regularity theoretic notion
of causation directly mirrors central pre-theoretic intuitions with respect to
the cause-effect relation as e.g. expressed in “The same cause is always
accompanied by the same effect”. The conceptual apparatus resorted to by
a regularity theoretic analysis is fully embedded within the uncontroversial
and well mastered area of extensional standard logic.1 Furthermore, unlike
e.g. counterfactual accounts regularity theories straightforwardly handle cases
of overdetermination. As against interventionist or manipulatory accounts,
analyses of causation in terms of regularities do not run the risk of being
anthropocentric. Contrary to probabilistic accounts, regularity theories are
not compromised by paradoxical data as, for instance, generated in cases of
Simpson’s Paradox. Finally, while transference theories treat a fundamental
type of causal process, transference processes, as conceptually primitive and
thus do not attempt to provide a reductive analysis of causation, regularity
accounts, properly conceived, offer the promising prospect of explicating
causation in entirely non-causal terms.
Hence, the pages to come shall review the objections that have traditionally
been raised against regularity accounts. It will be shown that most of these
objections target strikingly over-simplified regularity theoretic sketches. By
outlining ways to refute these objections it will be argued that the prevalent
conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been hasty – to
say the least.
1There are some analyses of causation referred to as “regularity theories” that are stated in terms
of nomic sufficiency which cannot be spelled out by means of first-order logic, but presupposes
some modal system (cf. e.g. Hausman 1998, pp. 42–43). This terminology, however, blurs the
important distinction between empiricist and modal analyses. Such as not to drop this distinction
the label “regularity theory” is reserved for first-order analyses in this paper.
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Hume’s Legacy
The philosophical core of regularity theories of causation consists of three
main tenets: (1) the causal relation is not an ontological primitive, (2) general
causation – causation on type level – is the primary analysandum,2 and (3)
universal regularities among event types or factors constitute the primary
analysans. There are – at least – two causal relations, one on type and another
on token level. “Drinking is a cause of drunkenness” is a case of general
causation, i.e. causation among factors, while “Shamus’ drinking of 6 beers
at noon on September 7, 2004 causes Shamus’ drunkenness in the afternoon
of September 7, 2004” relates token events and, accordingly, is a case of
singular causation. A factor that is related to another factor in terms of general
causation is said to be causally relevant to the latter. For brevity, if a first factor
is causally relevant to a second factor, the first can also be referred to as a
cause of the second. Moreover, such as to avoid unnecessary terminological
complications, I shall often simply speak of causation whenever both causal
relations are at issue or whenever the context clarifies whether singular or
general causation is under consideration. Factors are taken to be similarity sets
of event tokens. They are sets of type identical token events, of events that
share at least one feature. Contrary to token events, event types are generic
entities. Whenever a member of a similarity set that corresponds to an event
type occurs, the latter is said to be instantiated.
According to Hume, the godfather of regularity theories, single event
sequences are not identifiable as being of causal nature by some inherent
physical feature or property. A causal interpretation of an event sequence is
warranted only if the corresponding events, understood as spatiotemporally
located tokens or particulars,3 instantiate factors one of which is related in
terms of general causation to the other. Thus, as singular causation can be
straightforwardly accounted for given an analysis of general causation, spelling
out the latter relation constitutes the core goal of a regularity theory – hence
tenet (2). For completeness, singular causation is separately accounted for in
“Singular Causation” below.
Events are symbolized by italicized minuscules a, b , etc., with variables x, y,
x1, x2, etc. running over the domain of events. Factors, on the other hand, are
symbolized by italicized capital letters A, B, etc., with variables Z , Z1, Z2 etc.
running over the domain of factors. An event type as “striking a match” can be
2There are some regularity theoretic proposals that do not subscribe to this tenet (e.g. Mackie
1965), but rather take singular causation to be primary. Some criticism raised against regularity
theories over the past four decades targets this kind of singularist account (cf. Collins et al. (2004);
Kim 1973; Davidson 1967). As the paper at hand is only concerned with regularity theories whose
primary analysandum is general causation, these singularist objections will be disregarded in the
present context (cf. also “Singular Causation” below).
3This focus on events does not straightforwardly cover cases of causally related absences or
omissions. The problems posed by causal dependencies as between omitted vaccination and
contracting influenza will be neglected in the present context. They are treated in Baumgartner
(2006), Chap. 3. For interesting proposals on how to deal with causation among absences cf. also
Collins et al. (2004).
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defined as the set consisting of all token events in the extension of the predicate
“. . . is a striking of a match”, i.e. as {x : x is a striking of a match}. Factors are
negatable. The negation of a factor A is written thus: A. A is simply defined
as the complementary set of A.4 Alternatively, factors can be seen as binary
variables that take the value 1 whenever an event of the corresponding type
occurs and the value 0 whenever no such event occurs.
Generic causal dependencies are not one-to-one, but many-to-one depen-
dencies. Or put differently, while effects correspond to single factors, causes
are parts of whole causing complexes – complex causes. A complex cause
only becomes causally effective if all of its constituents are co-instantiated,
i.e. instantiated close-by or coincidently. Coincidently instantiated factors are
termed coincidences. Coincidences can be seen as conjunctions of coinci-
dently instantiated factors A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧ An, which for simplicity shall be
abbreviated by a mere concatenation of the respective factors: A1 A2 . . . An.5
Ordinarily, only a small subset of members of a complex cause are known
or of interest to a causal investigation. Variables X1, X2, etc. are used to
run over unknown or neglected elements of complex causes, e.g. AX1, BX2.
Regularity theories subscribe to the principle of determinism which stipulates
that, if the same causes are instantiated, the same effects occur. Expressed in
the regularity theoretic terminology that yields: Causes are sufficient for their
effects, i.e. if AX1 is a complex cause of B, AX1 → B. Moreover, instances of
factors do not cause themselves – no self-causation on token level –, and effects
and causes are spatiotemporally proximate – no action at a distance.6 All of
this yields a first Hume-inspired proposal for a regularity theoretic account of
causal relevance:
(I) A is causally relevant to B iff A is part of a sufficient condition AX1 of
B, such that the instances of AX1 and B differ and are spatiotemporally
proximate.
Note that the relational constraints (I) imposes on the instances of fac-
tors that are related in terms of general causation forestall a formalization
of causal statements by means of simple propositional conditionals. These
relational constraints can only be adequately represented by means of first-
order expressions, which are properly introduced in the Appendix. While the
decisive theoretical work as regards the analysis of causal relevance is done
by regularities existing among the factors involved in a causal structure, those
4Instead of factors or event types one may also speak of event properties, as long as the latter are
spelled out in purely extensional terms. Since the notion of a property tends to give rise to far-
reaching questions as to the extensional definability of properties or to the existence of negative
properties (cf. Zangwill 2003), I prefer the philosophically less biased notion of a factor.
5Such a mere propositional formalization of coincidences can be read in terms of “Factor A1 is
instantiated coincidently with A2 and . . . and An”.
6Hume originally required temporal succession, not mere proximity (cf. Hume 1748, p. 146). In
accordance with the usual practice, causes and effects are here only required to be spatiotempo-
rally proximate such as not to preclude the possibility of simultaneous or backward causation on a
priori grounds (cf. “Non-Symmetry”).
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relational constraints merely assure that a suitable subset of all regularities
among corresponding factors is chosen as a starting point for causal analyses.
The relational constraints delineate the causally interesting regularities from
causally meaningless regularities as “Whenever there is a table, there is a
table”, “For every first human step on the lunar surface there is a first
human non-stop balloon flight around the world”, or “Whenever there is a
soccer game, there is a sport event”. Throughout the main part of this paper
propositional conditionals are used as convenient abbreviations of the causally
interesting regularities identified by the first-order expressions presented in the
Appendix.
Monotony
Implementing regularities along the lines of (I) to identify generic causal
dependencies does not amount to a feasible analysis of causal relevance,
because there are regularities of the required type that are not amenable to
a causal interpretation. One such type of regularities is due to the law of
monotony: Antecedents of conditionals can be salva veritate supplemented
by further conjuncts. Striking a match with a certain speed and thrust, factor
A, dryness of its flammable head (B), and presence of oxygen (C) shall be
assumed to be jointly sufficient for the corresponding match to catch fire (D),
i.e. ABC → D. Yet, if A, B, and C are jointly sufficient for the match to light,
the combination of ABC and singing a song is thus sufficient, too. Or formally:
ABC → D  ABCX → D, (1)
where X stands for an arbitrary factor or conjunction of factors. This demon-
strates that being a part of a sufficient condition, i.e. being a conjunct within a
sufficient conjunction of factors, is by no means sufficient for being a cause of
the corresponding conditioned factor.
Broad (1930) has been the first to propose a solution to this problem. He
does not analyze causes to be mere parts of sufficient conditions, but rather
to be non-redundant parts of such conditions. A non-redundant part of a
sufficient condition can be spelled out – in purely logical terms7 – as a conjunct
of a sufficient condition such that, if it is eliminated from that condition, the
latter loses its sufficiency for a corresponding effect. Accordingly, complex
causes must be taken to be minimally sufficient conjunctions of factors – a
minimally sufficient conjunction being a conjunction that does not have suf-
ficient proper parts.
7Not all critics of regularity accounts have taken note of these purely logical ways to minimalize
sufficient conditions. For instance, in 1970 Brand and Swain still erroneously claimed that
minimalizing sufficient conditions cannot be accomplished in non-causal and, thus, non-circular
terms (cf. Brand and Swain 1970, p. 226).
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(II) A is causally relevant to B iff A is part of a minimally sufficient
condition AX1 of B, such that the instances of AX1 and B differ and
are spatiotemporally proximate.
Applying (II) to the match example prohibits a causal interpretation of the
combination of striking a match, presence of oxygen, dryness of the match,
and singing a song. The conjunction of these factors is merely sufficient, but
not minimally sufficient for the match to catch fire. Requiring a minimalization
of sufficient conditions in Broad’s sense precludes a causal interpretation of
arbitrary extensions of sufficient conditions based on the law of monotony.
Empty Regularities
Consider again the match example. The presence of oxygen, factor C, in
combination with a properly struck match (A) with a dry head (B) is not
the only minimally sufficient condition of the match catching fire (D) that
contains C. Another such condition is constituted by the presence of oxygen
and the absence of oxygen: CC. A contradiction is sufficient for any factor,
not only for matches catching fire, but also for rain to fall and elephants to
be born. That CC is moreover minimally sufficient for a match to light can
easily be verified by either removing C or C, both of which is accompanied
by a loss of sufficiency for D. More generally put: Material conditionals are
true if their antecedents are false or non-instantiated, or empty for short. Any
regularity statement AX1 → B whose antecedent is empty is, accordingly,
termed an empty regularity. Empty regularities do not only result from logically
non-instantiatable antecedents, but also from physically non-instantiatable
antecedents as, for instance, “Whenever Pegasus goes skiing, Lake Thun is
made of gold”.
The truth of empty regularity statements raises another often cited problem
for regularity accounts: Empty regularities are, notwithstanding their truth,
not amenable to a causal interpretation.8 The combination of absence and
presence of oxygen – CC – does not cause the sinking of Mississippi steamers,
even though CC in fact is minimally sufficient for these sinkings. Neither can
Pegasus’ ski tour be seen as a cause of the golden content of a lake.
Solutions to this problem are easily thought of. It is not the case that only a
certain proper subset of all empty regularities consists of regularities that are
not causally interpretable, rather, no empty regularities are thus interpretable.
Causal dependencies only exist among causes and effects that are instantiated
in nature. “Instantiated” in this context is not to be read in terms of “has
occurred prior to a specific moment of investigation”, but in terms of “has not
occurred in all past and will not occur in all future”.9 Factors and conjunctions
of factors may not be causally related if they have not been instantiated in all
8Cf. e.g. Armstrong (1983).
9Cf. the tenseless use of “exist” e.g. in Russell (1986), p. 217.
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past and will not be instantiated in all future. Therefore, empty regularities
can straightforwardly be excluded from causal interpretability by adding a
further constraint to (II) that requires the antecedent of causally interpretable
regularities to be non-empty.10
(III) A is causally relevant to B iff the following conditions hold:
(1) A is part of a minimally sufficient condition AX1 of B,
(2) The instances of AX1 and B differ and are spatiotemporally
proximate,
(3) There is an instance of AX1.
Non-Symmetry
Another objection often raised against regularity accounts concerns the di-
rection causation. The cause-effect relation is not symmetric and this lacking
symmetry is usually claimed not to be adequately representable in regularity
theoretic terms. In order to clarify what this criticism amounts to, some con-
ceptual preliminaries are required. First, non-symmetry must be distinguished
from asymmetry. A relation C is non-symmetric iff Eq. 2 holds and asymmetric
iff Eq. 3 holds.11
¬∀x∀y(Cxy → Cyx) or equivalently ∃x∃y(Cxy ∧ ¬Cyx) (2)
∀x∀y(Cxy → ¬Cyx) (3)
Every asymmetric relation with a non-empty extension is also non-symmetric,
but not vice versa. Predicating asymmetry of a non-empty relation is a much
stronger claim than predicating non-symmetry of it. It is undisputed that both
general and singular causation are non-symmetric relations. There exist both
general and singular causal dependencies and neither “A is causally relevant
to B” implies “B is causally relevant to A” nor “a causes b” implies “b causes
a”. Moreover, general causation clearly is not asymmetric, for there are event
types that are causally relevant to themselves, as e.g. in causal cycles. For
instance, with increasing unemployment the consumption of the population
is reduced. This causes decreased profits on the side of the employers, which,
in turn, causes them to lay off even more people. Thus, the unemployment
increases anew. In contrast, on token level there are no events that cause
themselves. Contrary to general causation, singular causation is irreflexive.
Yet, whether it is moreover asymmetric is a question that is controversially
10Note that regularity theories of laws of nature are not as easily rendered immune to the empty
regularities problem as regularity theories of causation. While factors without instances may not
be claimed to be causally dependent, there may well be natural laws involving predicates with
empty extensions, as e.g. “. . . travels faster than light” (cf. Molnar 1969).
11This terminology corresponds to logical and mathematical conventions (cf. e.g. Lemmon 1965,
pp. 180–182). In addition to non-symmetry and asymmetry a relation may lack symmetry in terms
of antisymmetry. A relation C is antisymmetric iff ∀x∀y(x = y ∧ Cxy → ¬Cyx).
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disputed in the literature. If event a is a cause of event b , does it follow that
b is not a cause of a? Is there reciprocal causation on token level?12 For the
purposes at hand this question can be postponed until “Singular Causation,”
for a regularity theory that focuses on general causation primarily needs to
account for the latter’s non-symmetry. In consequence, the criticism against
regularity theories to the effect that they are not capable of adequately cap-
turing the direction of causation amounts to the claim that the non-symmetry
of general causation cannot be mirrored on regularity theoretic grounds. And
indeed, prima facie there appears to be a problem.
A being causally relevant to B neither implies B being causally relevant to
A nor B being causally relevant to A. However, by contraposition A → B is
a true regularity statement iff B → A is so too. Which of these conditionals is
to be causally interpreted? It is certainly not the case that a factor is causally
relevant to another factor iff the negation of the latter is causally relevant to
the negation of the former. Accordingly, many critics of regularity theories
have claimed that regularity accounts cannot adequately distinguish between
causes and effects.13 (III) identifies A to be a cause of B iff it identifies B to
be cause of A, which indicates that we have not come up with an adequate
analysis of causal relevance yet.
Satisfactorily mirroring the non-symmetry of general causation is an intri-
cate problem any theory of causation has to solve. Normally the direction of
causal relevance is accounted for with recourse to some non-symmetry that is
external to the conceptual framework used in the analysans of causal relevance
as – most prominently – the direction of time or human manipulation and
intervention.14 Applied to the regularity theory considered here, this could
possibly mean that conditionals in the sense of (III) are causally interpretable
only if the instances of the antecedent precede the instances of the consequent.
Along these lines, one of A → B and B → A could be excluded from causal
interpretability. However, spelling out the non-symmetry of general causation
by means of the direction of time presupposes that the latter is accounted
for independently of the direction of causation, which runs counter to an
often adopted program in the philosophy of time that takes the direction of
causation to be primary.15 Furthermore, a temporal account of the direction
of causal relevance would stipulate that simultaneous and backward causation
are impossible on mere conceptual grounds. Yet, while simultaneous causation
seems to be a physical possibility, backward causation, if impossible at all, is
thought to be excluded on physical grounds. Resorting to manipulation, on
the other hand, relativizes the non-symmetry of general causation to human
intervention, where, intuitively, this non-symmetry seems to be perfectly
independent of human existence. Causal processes – as planetary movements
12Cf. Eells (1991), Chap. 5, Hausman (1998), pp. 44–47.
13Cf. e.g. Armstrong (1983), Chap. 2.
14Cf. e.g. Suppes (1970) or Price (1992). Temporal order, of course, is not only non-symmetric in
the above sense, but moreover asymmetric.
15Cf. e.g. Reichenbach (1956).
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or volcanic eruptions on Saturn – that are not manipulable by humans are
non-symmetric and can be oriented just as everyday earthly processes as the
breaking of a window or the starting of a car engine which are open to human
intervention. Moreover, it is unclear how the notions of agency, intervention,
and manipulation could be clarified without recourse to causation. In fact,
these notions seem to straight-out presuppose clarity on causation.16
This is a generalizable consequence of implementing any external non-
symmetry for a theoretical account of the non-symmetry of general causation:
The external non-symmetry becomes more basic than causal relevance.
Thereby a straightforward causal analysis of these external non-symmetries is
blocked. As long as we are not inevitably constrained to an analysis of the di-
rection of causal relevance by means of an external non-symmetry, theoretical
prudence calls for abstinence from recourse to such non-symmetries. Indeed,
regularity theories are capable of capturing the direction of general causation
without recourse to non-symmetries that are external to the conceptual frame-
work of a regularity theoretic analysans of causal relevance.
General causation can be oriented on mere logical grounds. Roughly,
while conditional dependencies among single factors cannot be attributed a
direction without resorting to external non-symmetries, complex nets of such
dependencies can be oriented based on existing regularities only. There are
several alternative causes for each effect. A match can be lit by either striking
it against a match box, by exposing it to fire or to a flammable chemical etc.
Accordingly, causally interpretable regularities are far more complex than
expressed by (III). Rather than merely one minimally sufficient condition,
many alternative minimally sufficient conditions must be invoked for each
effect. Moreover, instances of effects do not occur without at least one of their
sufficient causes being instantiated. These mutual dependencies among causes
and effects are tentatively expressible by means of a biconditional as in Eq. 4.17
ACD ∨ EFG ∨ HI J ↔ B (4)
Each complex cause of B is minimally sufficient for B, while the disjunction
of all alternative causes is necessary for B.18 Ordinarily, only a small subset of
the alternative causes involved in an investigated causal structure are known
or of interest to that investigation. Below, variables YA1 , YA2 , etc. will be used
to run over unknown or neglected elements of alternative causes of effects A1
and A2, respectively, but, for simplicity, let us here assume that ACD, EFG,
and HI J constitute all alternative causes of B.
16Cf. Woodward (2003), Chap. 3.
17Equation 4 is a mere tentative formal representation, for, as mentioned in “Hume’s Legacy,”
propositional logic does not allow for adequately expressing the relational constraints implicit in
causal regularities in the sense of (III) (cf. “First-Order Formalization” for details on the first-order
representation of these constraints).
18This essentially corresponds to Mackie’s (1974) famous analysis of causation in terms of so-called
INUS-conditions. Mackie (1974) will not be given an in-depth review in the present context. This
has been done in Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004), Chap. 5.
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Equation 4 is non-symmetric with respect to the factors to the left and the
right of “↔”. The instantiation of a particular disjunct is minimally sufficient
for B, but not vice versa. B does not determine a particular disjunct to be
instantiated.19 B only determines the whole disjunction of minimally sufficient
conditions. Hence, given that an instantiation of ACD is observed, it can
be inferred that there is an instance of B somewhere in the corresponding
spatiotemporal neighborhood. On the other hand, if an instance of B is
observed, no such inference to a proximate instantiation of ACD is possible.
The observed instance of B might well have been caused by EFG. This non-
symmetry corresponds to the non-symmetry of determination. It induces a
specification of (III) along the following lines:
(IV) A is causally relevant to B iff the following conditions hold:
(1) A is a part of a minimally sufficient condition AX1 of B,
(2) AX1 is a disjunct contained in a disjunction AX1 ∨ X2 ∨ . . . ∨ Xn,
n ≥ 2, of other minimally sufficient conditions of B, such that
AX1 ∨ X2 ∨ . . . ∨ Xn is necessary for B,
(3) The instances of AX1 ∨ X2 ∨ . . . ∨ Xn and B differ and are spa-
tiotemporally proximate,
(4) There is an instance of AX1, X2, . . . , and of Xn.
Clearly though, by contraposition Eq. 4 is equivalent to
B ↔ ¬(ACD) ∧ ¬(EFG) ∧ ¬(HI J) (5)
However, in view of the fact that effects have several alternative causes,
(IV) restricts the causal interpretability of complex regularity statements to
one specific syntactical form. Within a set of logically equivalent regularity
statements, only expressions with a syntax that exhibits alternative minimally
sufficient conditions as disjuncts of a necessary condition are causally inter-
pretable. Applied to Eqs. 4 and 5, this syntactical constraint prohibits a causal
interpretation of Eq. 5, for it does not render an underlying causal structure
transparent in the sense just delineated.20
Equations 4 and 5 are moreover equivalent to a biconditional that results
from Eq. 5 by factoring out and bringing the right-hand side back into
disjunctive normal form:
AEH ∨ AEI ∨ . . . ∨ DGJ ↔ B (6)
In contrast to Eq. 5, Eq. 6 is unproblematically causally interpretable. While
Eq. 4 identifies three minimally sufficient conditions as complex causes of B,
19Cf. Graßhoff and May (2001), pp. 97–99. Similar analyses of the direction of causation have been
proposed in Russell (1913), p. 199, Sanford (1976) or Hausman (1998).
20The fact that logically equivalent expressions differ with respect to the straightforwardness of
their causal interpretation is analogous to the fact that divergent normal forms differ with respect
to how transparent they render truth conditions of logical formulae. For instance, it is much more
intricate to read off truth conditions from prenex normal forms than, say, from normal forms with
minimal quantifier scopes (cf. Hintikka 1973).
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Eq. 6 establishes the causally interpretable minimally sufficient conditions of
B. Each of those conditions amounts to a conjunction consisting of the nega-
tion of exactly one conjunct of each disjunct of Eq. 4. Furthermore, Eq. 6 does
not reverse the direction of the dependencies expressed in Eq. 4. Both identify
B and B, respectively, as effects and the other factors as causes. Thus, there is
one regularity statement complying to the syntactical constraints imposed by
(IV) for a positive effect and one for the latter’s negative complement. Both
of these regularities exhibit the same non-symmetry. Accordingly, neither of
them poses a problem for (IV).
It might be objected that, while effects have multiple alternative causes,
causes likewise could have multiple alternative effects. That means the
following biconditional could be argued to describe a causal structure as well:
ACD ∨ EFG ∨ HI J ↔ B1 ∨ B2 (7)
Apparently, if a causal interpretation of Eq. 7 is in fact warranted, cause
and effect factors cannot be discriminated by means of the non-symmetry of
determination resorted to in (IV). Equation 7 is perfectly symmetric as regards
determination of one side of the biconditional by the other: No factors on
either side determine any other factors. For example, according to Eq. 7 ACD
can be instantiated in combination with B1 B2 or with B1 B2. The analogue
holds for, say, B1 which is claimed to occur with either ACD or EFG or HI J
by Eq. 7. If Eq. 7 is causally interpreted, the principle of determinism is vio-
lated, for it is then no longer guaranteed that causes are always accompanied
by the same effects. Equation 7 can only be seen to represent a causal structure
if it is implicitly presupposed that causes are sometimes accompanied by a first
effect and sometimes by a second. Indeed, a causal structure as stipulated by
a causal interpretation of Eq. 7 could not be oriented in the vein of (IV).
As to (IV) it is completely indeterminate which side of the biconditional in
Eq. 7 is seen to contain causes and effects, respectively. As indicated in the
introductory section, however, regularity theories presuppose causation to be a
deterministic relation. Against the background of this presupposition, a causal
interpretation of Eq. 7 is not warranted in the first place. Only biconditionals
not featuring disjunctions on both sides can be seen to represent deterministic
causal structures.
A successful discrimination between causes and effects in the vein of (IV)
presupposes the validity of the principle of determinism. The vast majority
of theories of causation indeed take causation to be deterministic. For, even
though the existence of irreducibly indeterministic processes is hardly chal-
lengeable according to standard interpretations of quantum mechanics, there
are many open questions – as for instance raised by phenomena of the EPR
type21 – with respect to the causal interpretability of these processes. For
lack of space, the metaphysical question as to the validity of the principle
of determinism cannot be properly addressed here. All that matters for our
21Cf. van Fraassen (1989).
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purposes is that symmetric biconditionals as Eq. 7 cannot be seen to represent
deterministic causal structures and that, accordingly, the direction of a deter-
ministic causal relation can be successfully accounted for by drawing on the
non-symmetry of determination between cause and effect factors. If it should
turn out that there are irreducibly indeterministic causal processes after all,
the non-symmetry of such processes would have to be analyzed along different
lines.
Accounting for the non-symmetry of general causation in the vein of (IV)
has an important implication as regards the minimal complexity of causal
structures. A factor or conjunction of factors X1 that is both minimally
sufficient and necessary for another factor or conjunction of factors X2 cannot
be identified as cause of X2, for, in that case, X2 is minimally sufficient and
necessary for X1 as well. All empirical evidence such a dependency structure
generates is constituted by perfectly correlated instantiations of X1 and X2 –
both are either co-instantiated or absent. Such empirical data is not causally
interpretable. In order to distinguish causes from effects and to orient the
cause-effect relation, at least two alternative causes are needed for each effect.
It must be emphasized, however, that, while generic causal structures can be
uncovered only based on data that meets these minimal diversity constraints,
no such requirements must be satisfied in order to detect causal dependencies
on token level. Normally, effect events are not overdetermined. Hence, in their
particular situations of occurrence cause events are both sufficient and neces-
sary for their effect events. Token causes and effects cannot be discriminated
by means of the non-symmetry of determination. Instead, they can be kept
apart by drawing on the generic causal structures they instantiate. Once the
non-symmetry of general causation is accounted for, a token event a can be
identified as a cause of an event b if a and b instantiate two factors A and B,
respectively, such that A is a type level cause of B.22
Contrary to the widespread opinion in the literature, regularity theories
are not only capable of adequately capturing the non-symmetry of general
causation, but moreover offer the prospect of successfully doing so without re-
sorting to non-symmetries external to the conceptual framework implemented
in their analysans of causation. Against this background, such external non-
symmetries as the direction of time or of human intervention remain amenable
to a straightforward analysis in terms of the direction of causal relevance.
Spurious Regularities
One of the most widespread criticisms against regularity theories stems from
so-called spurious regularities.23 Consider two parallel effects A and B of a
common cause C and assume, for simplicity’s sake, that C in fact is minimally
22This only indicates the general idea behind a regularity theoretic analysis of singular causation.
For details see “Singular Causation.”
23Cf. e.g. Cartwright (1989), pp. 25–29.
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Fig. 1 A common cause
structure that gives rise
to spurious regularities
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sufficient for A and B. Let us suppose, furthermore, that there exists one
minimally sufficient alternative cause for A and B each – D for A and E for
B. All in all, the causal structure under consideration thus is assumed to be
of a form as depicted in Fig. 1. In this constellation, A in combination with
the absence of D, i.e. AD, is minimally sufficient for B without AD being a
complex cause of B. Whenever AD occurs, C is present as well, for no effect
occurs without any of its causes. Hence, if D is absent, C must be present to
account for A. Furthermore, since C is taken to be sufficient for B, it follows
that AD is sufficient for B as well. Of course, AD is moreover part of a
necessary condition of B:
AD ∨ C ∨ E ↔ B (8)
According to (IV), Eq. 8 is a regularity statement that is causally interpretable.
This clearly is an unacceptable consequence, for, as mentioned above, relative
to the construction of the structure in Fig. 1, AD is not causally relevant to B.
Structures as the one under consideration are ubiquitous. The most famous
concrete example of this type is the so-called Manchester-Factory-Hooters
example based on which Mackie (1974) ultimately abandoned the attempt to
provide a genuine regularity theoretic analysis of general causation.24 Exam-
ples of this type unmistakably demonstrate that necessary conditions, just as
sufficient conditions, may contain redundant elements. A being necessary for
B implies that A ∨ C is necessary for B. Or formally:
B → A  B → A ∨ C (9)
Any true conditional stays true if any (true or false) disjunct is added to its
consequent. In analogy to the case of sufficient conditions, the extendability of
necessary conditions by arbitrary disjuncts forecloses a causal interpretability
of necessary conditions. A causal interpretation of necessary conditions is only
warranted if the conditions exclusively contain factors that are essential to
the bringing about of the purported effect. Arbitrary factors as C in Eq. 9 or
24Cf. Mackie (1974), pp. 83–87, Cartwright (1989), pp. 25–29. In Baumgartner and Graßhoff
(2004), pp. 99–103, we discuss the Manchester-Hooters case in all detail along with a solution
to the problem it poses.
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conditions as AD in Eq. 8 must – even if they are minimally sufficient – not be
incorporated in necessary conditions that are causally interpreted.
A solution to this problem that is parallel to the solution of the difficulties
induced by monotony as been proposed in Graßhoff and May (2001): Neces-
sary conditions must be minimalized. The latter are minimalized analogously
to sufficient conditions: A necessary condition is minimally necessary iff it does
not contain a necessary proper part. Minimalizing necessary conditions in this
vein eliminates just the spurious minimally sufficient conditions as AD from
complex regularity statements as Eq. 8. In order to see this, consider again
the structure depicted in Fig. 1: Whenever B is given, C or E is instantiated.
Thus, C ∨ E is necessary for B. The antecedent of Eq. 8 has no other necessary
proper part. AD ∨ C is not necessary, for there are instances of B without AD
and C being instantiated – say, when AD is given along with C and E. Neither
is AD ∨ E necessary for B: There are instances of B without instances of AD
and E occurring – for example, when AD is given in combination with E and
C. Among the elements of the necessary condition of B mentioned in Eq. 8
the following non-symmetry holds, which allows for eliminating AD: AD is
sufficient for C ∨ E, while C ∨ E is not sufficient for AD. That means C ∨ E is
a minimally necessary disjunction of minimally sufficient conditions of B.
Reflecting this maximal minimalization, minimally necessary disjunctions of
minimally sufficient conditions of a given factor are labeled minimal theories of
that factor. A minimal theory of a factor B is a minimally necessary disjunction
φ of minimally sufficient conditions of B, such that (a) φ contains at least two
disjuncts, (b) conjuncts in each disjunct are coincidently instantiated, (c) B
is instantiated in the spatiotemporal neighborhood of its minimally sufficient
conditions, and (d) the instances of B differ from the instances of its minimally
sufficient conditions. The operator “⇒” is introduced to abbreviate the formal
expression corresponding to minimal theories. Accordingly, the minimal the-
ory describing the behavior of B in the exemplary structure depicted in Fig. 1
has the following form:25
C ∨ E ⇒ B (10)
C ∨ E is the antecedent of the minimal theory (10) and B its consequent. A
factor Z is said to be part of a minimal theory  iff Z is a conjunct of at least
one disjunct in the antecedent of .
The notion of a minimal theory, however, is not itself sufficient to solve
the problem posed by spurious regularities. For a proper minimalization of
necessary conditions is always dependent on the availability of the proper
minimally sufficient conditions involved in an investigated causal structure.
This availability may not be guaranteed at the beginning of a causal investi-
gation. Analyses of causal structures must be relativized to the set of examined
factors, which shall be referred to as the factor frame of the analysis. Ordinarily,
factor frames are gradually expanded in the course of investigating a structure.
25Cf. Baumgartner and Graßhoff (2004), Chap. 5. For details on the first-order form of minimal
theories see “Minimal Theory” below.
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Suppose the scientific discipline investigating the causal structure depicted in
Fig. 1 first discovers that AD and E are minimally sufficient for B. At the
same time, the scientists concerned with B are confronted with instances of
B in situations where both AD and E are absent. We who know the actual
structure behind B, of course, can easily account for these cases: They are
cases in which D, C, B, E, and A are instantiated. At this stage of scientific
knowledge, however, the corresponding discipline will conjecture the validity
of the following minimal theory featuring the variable YB which runs over the
unknown alternative causes of B:26
AD ∨ E ∨ YB ⇒ B (11)
After a while of further investigation it is discovered that the formerly un-
known factor C constitutes an additional minimally sufficient condition of B,
i.e. the factor frame of the causal analysis at hand is extended. Moreover, now
the scientists can account for all instances of B. That means whenever B is
instantiated, there is an instance of AD, C, or E. Thus, a necessary condition
of B has been discovered. This finding immediately raises the question as to
whether this necessary condition is minimal. A disjunctive integration of C
into the antecedent of Eq. 11 yields:
AD ∨ C ∨ E (12)
As we have seen above, Eq. 12 is not a minimally necessary condition of
B. Upon the discovery of C, AD becomes redundant and accordingly drops
out of a minimalized necessary condition. Hence, extensions of factor frames
can directly affect the membership of a condition in a minimal theory. The
fact that AD is part of Eq. 11 does not guarantee that AD remains a
constituent of every minimal theory resulting from extending the factor frame
of Eq. 11. Therefore, despite all their causally interpretable features, minimal
theories are not directly causally interpretable. A minimal theory is causally
interpretable only if its factors stay part of that minimal theory across all
extensions of the corresponding factor frame.
The fact that the causal interpretability of a minimal theory cannot be
determined before its factor frame is fully expanded raises the question as to
the status of minimal theories prior to a complete expansion of their factor
frames. May (1999), p. 74, has pointed to an important feature of redundant
minimally sufficient conditions as AD that allows for their identification
prior to an exhaustive expansion of respective factor frames. Such redundant
conditions contain causally dependent factors that cannot be absent at the same
time, i.e. factors that are subcontrary. A and D are causally dependent in the
structure of Fig. 1. Against the background of that structure, these two factors
cannot both be absent. If A is not instantiated (A),there cannot be an event of
type D, thus D cannot be absent, and if D is not instantiated, i.e. if D is present,
A cannot be absent. Such causal dependencies among factors of minimally
26Cf. “Minimal Theory” for detailed introduction of Yx-variables.
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sufficient conditions are ‘minimalized away’ as respective factor frames are
extended.
Apart from a relativization of causal reasoning to a given factor frame the
minimalization of necessary conditions induced by the problem of spurious
regularities calls for a distinction between direct and indirect causal relevance.
For all indirect causes of an effect as B in Fig. 1 are redundant in a minimally
necessary condition of B. Nonetheless, indirect causes are causally relevant to
their indirect effects. Suppose, we introduce two alternative direct causes of C
into the structure of Fig. 1: F and G shall each be minimally sufficient for C. As
direct causes of C, F and G are indirect causes of B. However, Eq. 10 does not
allow for an integration of further factors. Both F and G imply C ∨ E while
the converse does not hold, thus, both F and G are redundant in a necessary
condition of B featuring C ∨ E.
Yet, even though causal relevancies cannot be directly read off minimal
theories, the latter constitute the core of the conceptual inventory needed
for a successful regularity theoretic handling of spurious regularities. While
membership in minimal theories that resists factor frame extensions accounts
for direct causal relevance, the transitive closure thereof accounts for indirect
relevance:
(V) (a) A is directly causally relevant to B iff the following conditions hold:
(1) A is a part of a minimal theory  of B,
(2) A stays part of  across all extensions of ’s factor frame.
(b) A is indirectly causally relevant to B iff there is a sequence of factors
Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn, n ≥ 3, such that A = Z1, B = Zn, and for each i,
1 ≤ i < n: Zi is directly causally relevant to Zi+1 in terms of (Va).
As May (1999), pp. 67–68, has shown, introducing a minimality constraint on
necessary conditions has a very important existential implication that allows
for dropping condition (4) of (IV): C ∨ E being minimally necessary for B
implies there being an instance of B without a corresponding instance of C –
refer to this scenario as S1 – and an instance of B without a corresponding
instance of E – scenario S2. That is, none of the two disjuncts is itself necessary
for B. Nonetheless the disjunction as a whole is necessary for B. Therefore,
both in S1 and in S2 there must be an instance of C ∨ E. Since in S1, by
assumption, there is no event of type C, there must be an event of type E – and
vice versa for S2. This finding is generalizable: Every disjunct of a minimally
necessary condition is instantiated at least once along with the corresponding
effect, when all the other disjuncts are absent.
Single-Case and Other Accidental Regularities
The problem induced by spurious regularities is not the only objection raised
against regularity theories of type (IV) in the literature. A problem for (IV)
that is closely related to the problem of empty regularities has e.g. been raised
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by Armstrong (1983).27 A conditional turns out true if both its antecedent
and consequent are true. Thus, if antecedent and consequent of a conditional
each report the occurrence of a singular event that actually has occurred, the
conditional as a whole is true. Therefore, Armstrong argues, a regularity as
required by a regularity theory exists among any two factors with a single
instance each, irrespective of whether they are causally related or not. No
doubt, a conditional as “Whenever Nero sets fire on Rome, the Titanic sinks”
is true and, no doubt, we are not prepared to hold Nero causally responsible for
the sinking of the Titanic. Hence, Armstrong’s argument continues, not only
empty, but also these so-called single-case regularities pose a serious problem
for a regularity theory.
At first, it must be pointed out that the plain truth of a conditional as
“Whenever Nero sets fire on Rome, the Titanic sinks” does not suffice to
identify Nero’s setting fire on Rome as a cause of the sinking of the Titanic
according to any of the regularity theoretic accounts (I) to (V) considered
thus far. For these accounts not only require causes and effects to satisfy a
material conditional, but moreover to be proximately instantiated. More is
said about spatiotemporal proximity in “Spatiotemporal Proximity of Causes
and Effects.” However, relative to any pre-theoretic understanding of that
notion it seems plain that Nero’s setting fire on Rome and the sinking of the
Titanic cannot be seen as proximate events. This shortcoming of Armstrong’s
argument is easily remedied. Assume that Harold Bride, the junior wireless
operator on the Titanic, for the first (and only) time in his life lit a Havana
cigar moments before the ship hit the iceberg. The conditional “Whenever
Harold Bride lights a Havana, the Titanic sinks” is true and, moreover, the
instances of its antecedent and consequent are spatiotemporally proximate.
Of course, Bride’s lighting of a Havana is not only sufficient, but moreover
minimally sufficient for the Titanic to sink. The antecedent of the above
regularity statement does not comprise a sufficient proper part. Furthermore,
Bride’s lighting of a Havana is not the only minimally sufficient condition of the
sinking of the Titanic. The latter’s real cause constituted by the collision with
the iceberg amounts to another such condition. Hence, there is a necessary
condition of the sinking of the Titanic that contains Bride’s lighting of a
Havana as a minimally sufficient disjunct. This suffices to refine Armstrong’s
argument such that it does justice to the complexity of causal structures as
required by (IV): Any two factors with exactly one instance each, such that
these instances are spatiotemporally proximate, satisfy a regularity as required
by (IV), yet by no means all thus related factors are related in terms of causal
relevance as well. Consequently, (IV) does not amount to a sufficient condition
for causal relevance.
That (IV) is unsuited as analysans of causal relevance has already been
demonstrated by the problem of spurious regularities. In order for Armstrong
to succeed in establishing that single-case regularities prove the fundamental
defectiveness of regularity accounts, his argument must be directed against
27Cf. Armstrong (1983), pp. 15–17, similarly Mellor (1995), p. 15, or Hausman (1998), p. 42.
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(V). It must be shown that Bride’s lighting of a Havana is not only contained
in a necessary condition of the sinking of the Titanic, but moreover is a
non-redundant part of a causally interpretable minimally necessary condition
thereof, i.e. that it is part of a minimal theory of the Titanic’s sinking.
Furthermore, it must be shown that Bride’s lighting of a Havana stays part
of that minimal theory across all factor frame extensions.
Before this further refinement will be attempted a possible objection against
Armstrong’s argument has to be considered. Antecedent and consequent of
“Whenever Harold Bride lights a Havana cigar, the Titanic sinks” involve
proper names or, if formal explications by means of definite descriptions are
preferred, predicates that apply to single events only – more generally: local
predicates, i.e. predicates that involve spacetime coordinates or singular terms.
The admissibility of local predicates in contexts of general causation, as is well
known, is commonly denied in the literature. The regularity under consider-
ation here shall therefore be rephrased in non-local terms. Let us grant that
“Whenever Harold Bride lights a Havana cigar, the Titanic sinks” represents
the exact same single-case regularity as “Whenever a person with genome
s lights a Havana cigar, an ocean liner with molecular structure t sinks”,
or formally S → T.
The Titanic’s collision with the iceberg, of course, is expressible by means of
non-local predicates as well. Symbolizing this (non-locally defined) collision
by C we get the following true biconditional that is causally interpretable
according to (IV):
S ∨ C ↔ T (13)
If S ∨ C is not merely necessary, but moreover both minimally necessary for T
and resistant against factor frame extensions, Eq. 13 not only refutes (IV), but
also (V). S ∨ C, however, does not amount to a minimally necessary condition
of T. There is only one single instance of each factor involved in Eq. 13.
Whenever T occurs, both S and C are present nearby. Thus, the antecedent
of Eq. 13 can be further minimalized:
S ↔ T (14)
C ↔ T (15)
Neither Eqs. 14 nor 15, however, correspond to minimal theories, for these
expressions merely report a perfect correlation of T and S and C. Any of
these factors is given if and only if the other two factors are given as well. Such
perfect correlations, as we have seen above, are not causally interpretable, for
none of the involved factors is identifiable as cause and effect, respectively.
Since (V) requires causally interpretable regularities to specify minimally
necessary conditions of a certain minimal complexity, neither Eqs. 14 nor 15
is amenable to a causal interpretation according to (V). That, however, does
not mean that (V) does not allow for identifying the collision with the iceberg
as a cause of the sinking of the Titanic. The impossibility to causally interpret
either Eqs. 14 or 15 merely indicates that the events involved in the sinking
of the Titanic are typecast in an overly fine-grained manner. Causal structures
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can only be unfolded when a sufficient amount of comparable test situations
are available. Thus, the Titanic’s sinking must be placed in a broader context,
it must be typecast in a more coarse-grained fashion, e.g. as a sinking of an
ocean liner. Such a typing will immediately yield far more instances for each
causal factor, which, in turn, will suspend biconditional dependencies as in
Eqs. 14 or 15. If not only the Titanic’s sinking, but ocean liner sinkings are
taken into consideration, many cigar lightings will be found that are in no
way followed by a sinking ocean liner, whereas collisions with icebergs either
retain their sufficiency for ocean liner sinkings or a subsequent expansion
of the corresponding factor frame will reveal them to be parts of minimally
sufficient conditions of such sinkings. Even within an extended factor frame,
cigar lightings, on the other hand, will not turn out to be non-redundant parts
of sufficient conditions of ocean liner sinkings.
As mentioned before, a regularity theoretic analysis of causal relevance
along the lines of (V) imposes important minimal complexity constraints on
generic causal structures. Generic structures are not one-to-one dependencies.
Every effect has several alternative complex causes. In order to establish such
dependencies, a certain amount of diversity in the empirical data is called for.
Without such diversity no causal diagnosis is possible. The successful discovery
of causal structures within any available theory of causation essentially hinges
on the quality of the available data. The regularity theoretic notion of causal
relevance expressed in (V) mirrors these minimal complexity requirements
and, accordingly, is not affected by the problem of single-case regularities.
The smaller the set of instances of a factor, the higher the chances that acci-
dental regularities as in the Titanic case exist. However, single-case regularities
only constitute a special type of accidental regularities. Regularities that are
not causally interpretable also appear in many-case scenarios. In order to
consider whether accidental regularities of the many-case type pose a problem
for (V), let us somewhat modify the shipwreck example. Suppose Shamus and
Fennella both are proud owners of a sailboat. Moreover, independently of each
other they both are hit by a storm, factor H, while sailing out in the lake, to the
effect that both of their boats sink. To the sinking of a sailboat we shall refer
by W. During the storm they both stumble, are thrown against the railings of
their boats and lose their left maxillary central incisors. Shamus’ mishap shall
be labeled I and Fennella’s J. As humans can lose specific incisors only once,
the following regularities hold for our two exemplary shipwrecks: Whenever
Shamus or Fennella lose their left maxillary central incisors, there is a sinking
of a sailboat, or formally
I ∨ J → W (16)
The converse, i.e. W → I ∨ J, does not hold. There are many sinkings of
sailboats without instances of either I or J. Thus, this example does not feature
biconditional dependencies as in the Titanic case. Moreover, as there are
two alternative minimally sufficient conditions of W, the minimal complexity
constraints imposed on causal structures by (V) are met. Does Eq. 16, hence,
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express accidental regularities that erroneously have to be causally interpreted
according to (V)?
Equation 16 is not a minimal theory of W, for, as mentioned above, it does
not cover all instances of W. Most sailboats sink when there is a storm without
loss of teeth. Moreover, there are countless further alternative causes of
shipwrecks, for instance fires or collisions with icebergs. If these further causes
are all represented by the variable YW , we get the following biconditional
dependency:
I ∨ J ∨ H ∨ YW ↔ W (17)
If Eq. 17 is a minimal theory involving factors that are resistant to factor frame
extensions, Eq. 17 must be causally interpreted according to (V), which, as a
consequence, would be seriously defective. Equation 17, however, is not a min-
imal theory of W. I ∨ J ∨ H ∨ YW is not minimally necessary for W; it contains
a necessary proper part, viz. H ∨ YW . Whenever either Shamus or Fennella
lose their incisors there is a storm, thus I ∨ J → H. Due to this dependency I
and J are redundant in necessary conditions containing H. That means the real
causes of an effect render conditions, that are merely accidentally minimally
sufficient, redundant in minimal theories. The minimalization of necessary
conditions as demanded by (V) not only precludes spurious regularities from
a causal interpretation but also accidental regularities. A regularity theory in
the vein of (V) is not forced to causally interpret accidental regularities of the
many-case type.
Singular Causation
The problem posed by single-case regularities demonstrates that a regularity
theory cannot be successful if its primary analysans is taken to be singular
causation, i.e. causation among token events. Directly accounting for singular
causation by means of sufficient and necessary conditions inevitably generates
a host of accidental regularities whose causal interpretation can hardly be
avoided without resorting to some form of nomic sufficiency or necessity and,
thus, without leaving the uncontroversial path of first-order languages. In con-
trast, the previous sections have shown that the complexity of generic causal
structures imposes important additional constraints on causal dependencies
on type level which allow for distinguishing between accidental and causal
regularities. Nonetheless, some regularity theories, as e.g. developed in Mackie
(1965), aim to analyze singular causation by means of first-order sufficient
and necessary conditions. In consequence, a lot of the criticism raised against
regularity theories over the past four decades targets this kind of singularist
account. In addition to their inability to avoid a causal interpretation of acci-
dental regularities it has, for instance, been claimed that singularist regularity
theories cannot properly deal with so-called preempted potential causes.28 As
28Cf. e.g. Collins et al. (2004).
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the regularity theory presented in this paper, however, focuses on general
causation from the outset, the singularist thread in the literature has been
neglected here.
Rather than discussing the problems encountered by an analysis of singular
causation in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions, the argument of
this paper shall be concluded by indicating how singular causation can be
accounted for by drawing on a regularity theoretic account of general causation
as given in (V). The basic idea behind the identification of token level causes
and effects based on (V) is utterly straightforward and has already been
anticipated in “Non-Symmetry.” Instead of stipulating that an event a is a
cause of an event b if a is in some sense sufficient or necessary for b , (V)
paves the way for identifying a as a cause of b if a and b instantiate two factors
A and B, respectively, such that A is causally relevant to B. More specifically,
in light of (V) the following transition from general to singular causation is at
hand:
Singular Causation (SC): An event a is a cause of an event b iff a instantiates
a factor A and b instantiates a factor B, such that
(a) A is a non-redundant part of a minimally sufficient condition AX of B
and every factor contained in AX is causally relevant to B according
to (V),
(b) a = b , and a and b occur within the same spatiotemporal frame,
(c) Every factor in X is instantiated coincidently with a.
As (V), this account of singular causation presupposes the admittedly vague
notions of a spatiotemporal frame and of coincidence. More is said about these
notions in the Appendix. In order to see the main features and qualities of
(SC), however, an intuitive assessment of when events are spatiotemporally
proximate as opposed to distant will suffice. First, note that (SC) yields an
irreflexive notion of singular causation. Cause and effect events are required
to differ. While event types may be causally relevant to themselves, there is
no self-causation on token level. Second, (SC) does not exclude token level
feedbacks. If there is a causally interpretable minimal theory featuring A as
a cause of B and another such theory featuring B as a cause of A, a may
be determined to cause b which, in turn, may be determined to cause a by
(SC). The existence of token level feedbacks is controversial in the literature.
Candidates for such feedbacks are e.g. static equilibria. One of the most
discussed examples of this kind is a stable house of cards. The two cards at
the top lean against each other. Each prevents the other from falling over.29
The debate as to the causal nature of static equilibria shall not be entered
into here. Whatever the outcome will be, it seems plain that the question as
to whether the card example constitutes a case of token level feedback or
not is not to be decided on a priori conceptual grounds. The existence of
simultaneous reciprocal singular causation is to be determined synthetically.
29Cf. e.g. Fair (1979), p. 230, Frankel (1986), and Hausman (1998), pp. 44–47.
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(SC), accordingly, does not rule out token level feedbacks. That means (SC)
yields a non-symmetric, but not an asymmetric notion of singular causation.
Apart from being non-committal with respect to the existence of causal
feedbacks on token level, (SC) has further notable merits. According to (SC),
an event a is only identified to cause an event b if a occurs along with all
other events instantiating a minimally sufficient condition AX of B. As a
direct consequence of this constraint, preempted potential causes of b are not
identified as genuine causes of b by (SC). Consider, for instance, the famous
desert traveler one of whose enemies drills a hole into his drinking bottle and
another poisons the water in the bottle.30 The traveler then dies of thirst. The
poisoning of the water is preempted by the perforation of the bottle. (SC)
indeed only identifies the latter event as a cause of the traveler’s death, for
crucial factors – as e.g. the drinking of the poisonous water – in combination
with which poisoning water only becomes lethal are not instantiated in the
desert traveler case.
Finally, reconsider the shipwreck of the Titanic. Even though Harold
Bride’s lighting of a Havana cigar, in the circumstances, is both sufficient and
necessary for the sinking of the Titanic, (SC) does not determine Bride’s action
to cause the end of the Titanic. There is no causally interpretable minimal
theory  such that Bride’s cigar lighting instantiates the antecedent of  and
the sinking of the Titanic instantiates ’s consequent. The accidental regularity
between Shamus’ loss of a tooth and his shipwreck is handled analogously.
Shamus’ tooth loss does not instantiate a factor which remains part of a
minimal theory of shipwrecks across factor frame extensions. Contrary to a
singularist regularity theory, thus, (SC) does not erroneously causally interpret
accidental regularities among event tokens.
Conclusion
Empty, single-case, and other accidental regularities, common cause structures
and the non-symmetry of general causation can all be adequately captured in
regularity theoretic terms. Regularity theories can do justice to the whole com-
plexity of generic causal structures. And all this is accomplished with simple
recourse to extensional standard logic. Appropriate minimalization strategies
are at hand such that redundancies implicit in material conditionals – e.g. due
to monotony – can be efficaciously precluded from a causal interpretation.
Characteristics of complex causal nets can be resorted to in order to distinguish
causal from spurious and accidental regularities. Finally, we have seen that a
regularity theoretic analysis of general causation can pave the way towards
a straightforward account of singular causation. All in all, this paper should
have shown that regularity theories can be conceived in a way that constitutes
a promising and very intuitive alternative to popular theoretical frameworks
as implemented by counterfactual or probabilistic analyses.
30Cf. Mackie (1974), pp. 44–46.
Philosophia (2008) 36:327–354 349
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Timm Lampert and Gerd Graßhoff for valuable
discussions about the issues addressed in this paper and three anonymous referees for this journal
for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Moreover, I am grateful to the Swiss National
Science Foundation for generous support of this work (Grant 1114-066803.01/1).
Appendix
First-Order Formalization
This appendix introduces the first-order formalizations of the core notions
involved in a regularity theory of type (V). As indicated in “Hume’s Legacy,”
the reason for a first-order representation of causal regularities lies in the
relational constraints that distinguish causally interesting regularities from
causally meaningless regularities as “Whenever there is a table, there is a
table”. Causes and effects are instantiated by spatiotemporally proximate
events, causal regularities are instantiated by different events, and factors
constituting a complex cause are instantiated coincidently. These three rela-
tional constraints characterizing causal regularities must be accounted for by
first-order means. I take them in turn.
Spatiotemporal Proximity of Causes and Effects
In accordance with Broad (1930), φ shall be defined to be a sufficient condition
of ψ iff Eq. 18 holds and a necessary condition of ψ iff Eq. 19 holds:
∀μ(φμ → ψμ) (18)
∀μ(ψμ → φμ) (19)
μ is to be read as a metavariable running over variables and φμ and ψμ stand
for any well-formed formulae with at least one free occurrence of μ.
Instances of causes and instances of their effects do not occur anywhere
and anytime, but close by, i.e. within a certain spatiotemporal frame or within
the same situation. The interpretation of the relation “. . . occurs in the same
spatiotemporal frame as . . . ” cannot be fixed to a certain spatiotemporal
interval independently of a causal process under investigation. However, in
order to make sure that no causal element is covertly introduced into the
notion of spatiotemporal proximity the latter shall be determined to be a
symmetric relation, which – as mentioned above – causal relevance clearly is
not. Certain instances of causes and effects can be said to be properly related
only if they are in direct spatiotemporal contact, while in other cases instances
of causes may well occur far away from the instances of their effects. The
theory of special relativity only provides an upper bound for this interval:
Instances of causes and effects must occur within each other’s light cones.
Notwithstanding this lacking specificity, given a concrete causal process it is
normally uncontroversial which events can be said to be properly related
350 Philosophia (2008) 36:327–354
in order to be amenable to a causal interpretation.31 Moreover, whenever
spatiotemporal proximity is unsuitably interpreted for a given causal process,
no dependencies appear in corresponding empirical data.32
If minimally sufficient and minimally necessary conditions should, at least
in principle, be open for causal interpretations, the syntax of acceptable
substitutions in Eqs. 18 and 19 must be restricted such that an instance x of
a cause factor and an instance y of an effect factor are required to occur in the
same spatiotemporal frame. In order to formally represent this spatiotemporal
association, we introduce the symmetric relation Rxy. This induces a first
approximation to a first-order representation of a causal regularity. Whoever
claims that A is a (sufficient) cause of B, claims that for all events x of type A
there is an event y of type B such that x and y occur in the same spatiotemporal
frame. This is captured by Eq. 20.
∀x(Ax → ∃y(By ∧ Rxy)) (20)
Causal vs. Semantic Regularities
Equation 20 not only describes causal regularities, but also what might be
referred to as semantic regularities or regularities of set inclusion as “When-
ever there is a soccer game, there is a sport event”. A semantic regularity is
given in case of two predicates one of which has an extension that is included
in the extension of the other. Accordingly, by satisfying the first of these
predicates an object or event eo ipso satisfies the other predicate. As single
objects or events are moreover spatiotemporally proximate to themselves,
one and the same object or event satisfies antecedent and consequent of a
semantic regularity. The soccer games and the sport events are identical, thus,
they certainly are spatiotemporally proximate according to any spatiotemporal
interval chosen as interpretation of R. In order to exclude semantic regularities
from consideration when it comes to causal analyses, it must be stipulated that
instances of causes differ from the instances of their effects. No token event
ever causes itself. Hence, Eq. 20 must be specified such that all models of the
31If the striking of a match in Switzerland is followed by a match catching fire in England, it is
clear that, even if the interval between these two events is thus that they are not excluded to
be causally related by special relativity, the striking in Switzerland does not cause the light in
England. On the other hand, given a concrete run of an experiment, say a number of substances
are brought together in a test tube, it is commonly presumed that no events occurring in the
course of this run are excluded from a causal dependency due to inadequate spatiotemporal
relatedness. Accordingly, whenever the spatiotemporal relation between singular causes and
effects is explicitly discussed in theoretical accounts of causation, it is commonly left as unspecified
as possible (cf. e.g. Xu 1997, pp. 159–160).
32As I show in Baumgartner (2006), Chap. 5, the relation “. . . occurs in the same spatiotemporal
frame as . . . ” can be suitably interpreted by means of a kind of trial–error procedure for every
causal context under investigation.
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specified formula feature different events as instances of the factors contained
in antecedent and consequent, respectively:
∀x(Ax → ∃y(By ∧ Rxy ∧ x = y)) (21)
Equation 21 states that for all events x of type A there is a different event
y of type B in the same spatiotemporal frame as x. In order to conveniently
abbreviate our notation, we introduce “ →”:
Z1 → Z2 =df ∀x(Z1x → ∃y(Z2 y ∧ x = y ∧ Rxy)) (22)
Coincidence
The factors of a complex cause only become causally effective if coincidently
instantiated. Hence, the factors contained in a minimally sufficient condition
must be required to be coincidently instantiated. In order to symbolically
represent coincident instantiations, I introduce the n-ary relation K with n
being the number of conjuncts in a minimally sufficient condition apart from
K itself. K subsists among the instances of the factors in a minimally sufficient
condition iff these factors are coincidently instantiated. K can be seen on
a par with any ordinary non-redundant factor within a minimally sufficient
condition. If K does not hold among the instances of a conjunction of factors,
the instantiations of these factors are not sufficient for the effect to occur. Thus,
in contrast to R, K may remain uninterpreted.
Only the subset of minimally sufficient conditions that include K can
possibly be causally interpreted. A possibly causally interpretable minimally
sufficient condition is of the form:
∀x1∀x2 . . .∀xn(A1x1∧ A2x2∧. . .∧ Anxn∧Kx1x2 . . . xn
→ ∃y(By∧x1 = y∧x2 = y∧. . .∧xn = y∧Rx1x2 . . . xn y)) (23)
As Eq. 23 demonstrates, the factors of a possibly causally interpretable mini-
mally sufficient condition are not required to be instantiated by the same event.
As long as they occur coincidently, factors in a complex cause may well be
instantiated by different events. The complexity of Eq. 23, which describes
a minimally sufficient condition by explicitly mentioning three factors only,
apparently calls for further abbreviations. To this end we adopt the convention
that a conjunction of factors whose instances are related in terms of K
shall simply be concatenated without conjunctor and without explicit mention
of K. A universally or existentially quantified conjunction of factors A1x1 ∧
A2x2 ∧ . . . ∧ Anxn ∧ Kx1x2 . . . xn, accordingly, is represented by A1 A2 . . . An.
A1 A2 . . . An =df A1x1 ∧ A2x2 ∧ . . . ∧ Anxn ∧ Kx1x2 . . . xn (24)
The quantifiers that bind the variables on the right-hand side of Eq. 24 can be
left unspecified, because this abbreviated notation is only used in connection
with “ →”, whose antecedent is determined to be universally quantified and
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whose consequent is existentially quantified by definition. Therefore, the
context in which expressions of type A1 A2 . . . An appear always clarifies the
nature of the quantifiers involved. Given this notational convention, Eq. 23
can be transparently stated thus:
A1 A2 . . . An → B
Minimal Theory
Before minimal theories can be formally represented, the abbreviated notation
initiated in the previous sections needs to be extended. Minimally sufficient
and minimally necessary conditions have been defined as (finite) open con-
junctions and disjunctions. In order to account for that openness, two types
of variables running over factors shall be introduced. For conjunctions of
unknown or unspecified factors within sufficient conditions we shall implement
the variables X1, X2, etc. Thus, these X-variables are to be read as running
over factors that are not explicitly integrated within sufficient conditions.
Xi =df Z1x1 ∧ Z2x2 ∧ Z3x3 ∧ . . . ∧ Znxn, n ≥ 1,
with i = 1, 2, 3, . . ., the variables Z1 . . . Zn running over factors, and quantifi-
cation depending on whether Xi appears right or left of “ →”.
Building on the definition of Xi, we define the variables YA, YB, etc. to
represent disjunctions whose disjuncts are not explicitly integrated within
necessary conditions. The subscripts in case of the Y-variables correspond to
the factors whose necessary condition a respective Y-variable complements.
Yx =df X1 ∨ X2 ∨ X3 ∨ . . . ∨ Xn, n ≥ 1,
with x = A, B, C, . . . and quantification equally depending on whether Yx
appears right or left of “ →”.
With these notational means at hand, a factor A being part of a minimally
sufficient condition of B, such that this minimally sufficient condition, in turn,
is part of a minimally necessary condition of B can be expressed thus:
(AX1 ∨ YB → B) ∧ (B → AX1 ∨ YB) (25)
Equation 25 states that whenever A is instantiated coincidently with other
factors X1 or one of the disjuncts in the domain of YB is instantiated, the factor
B is instantiated in the same spatiotemporal frame by an event that differs
from the instances of AX1 ∨ YB; and whenever B is instantiated, there is either
a coincident instantiation of AX1 or one of the disjuncts in the domain of YB
is instantiated in the same spatiotemporal frame, such that the instances of
B and of AX1 ∨ YB differ. Equation 25 can thus be seen as an abbreviation
of expressions of the form of Eq. 26, where the incompleteness is indicated
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by dots instead of X- and Y-variables and k and i stand for arbitrary natural
numbers.33
∀x1 . . .∀xi((A1x1 ∧ A2x2 ∧ . . . ∧ Aixi ∧ Kx1x2 . . . xi)
→ ∃y(By ∧ x1 = y ∧ . . . ∧ xi = y ∧ Rx1 . . . xi y))
∧ . . . ∧ ∀x1 . . .∀xk((Z1x1 ∧ Z2x2 ∧ . . . ∧ Zkxk ∧ Kx1x2 . . . xk)
→ ∃y(By ∧ x1 = y ∧ . . . ∧ xk = y ∧ Rx1 . . . xk y))
∧ ∀y(By → (∃x1 . . . ∃xi(A1x1 ∧ A2x2 ∧ . . . ∧ Aixi ∧ Kx1x2 . . . xi
∧ x1 = y ∧ . . . ∧ xi = y ∧ Rx1 . . . xi y) ∨ . . . ∨ ∃x1 . . . ∃xk(Z1x1 ∧ Z2x2
∧ . . . ∧ Zkxk ∧ Kx1x2 . . . xk ∧ x1 = y ∧ . . . ∧ xk = y ∧ Rx1 . . . xk y)))
(26)
Equation 26 clearly illustrates that minimal theories are highly intricate and
non-transparent first-order expressions. In order to abbreviate our notation
further, we introduce “⇒”:
Z1 ∨ Z2 ⇒ Z3 =df (Z1 ∨ Z2 → Z3) ∧ (Z3 → Z1 ∨ Z2)
This allows for transparently expressing Eqs. 25 and 26 as follows:
AX1 ∨ YB ⇒ B
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